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Abstract
We prove an existence result for the time-dependent generalized Nash
equilibrium problem under generalized convexity using a fixed point theo-
rem. Furthermore, an application to the dynamic abstract economy is con-
sidered.
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1 Introduction and definitions
Here, we consider the Lebesgue space L2pr0, T s,Rnq with the inner product
xxφ,ψyy “
ż T
0
φptqψptqdt.
The time-dependent generalized Nash equilibrium problem (time-dependent GNEP)
is a generalized Nash game in which each player’s strategy and objective function
depend on time. More precisely, let us assume that we have p players and to each
player ν P t1, 2, ..., pu we can associate a natural number nν . Set n “
pÿ
ν“1
nν .
Each player has a strategy xν P Xνpx
´νq Ă L2pr0, T s,Rnν q, where by x´ν P
L2pr0, T s,Rn´nν q we mean to denote the vector formed by all players’ strategies
except for those of player ν. The set Xνpx
´νq is the strategy space of player ν
given the strategy of the other players as it is usually the case in non-cooperative
games. We can also write x “ pxν , x´νq P
pź
ν“1
Xνpx
νq Ă L2pr0, T s,Rnq which
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is shorthand (already used in many papers on the subject, see e.g. [2, 8]) to denote
x “ px1, ..., xν´1, xν , xν`1, ..., xpq as a way to single out the strategy of player ν
within the full strategy vector. Each xνptq P Rnν can be thought of as a strategy of
player ν at time t P r0, T s. Then x P L2pr0, T s,Rnq is the full strategy vector and
thus xptq is the vector of strategies of all players at a given time t P r0, T s.
Let θν : L
2pr0, T s,Rnq Ñ R be the objective function for player ν. A strategy
xˆ P K Ă L2pr0, T s,Rnq is a time-dependent generalized Nash equilibrium ([2]) if
and only if for each player ν, we have xˆν P Xνpxˆ
´νq and
θνpxˆq ě θνpx
ν , xˆ´νq, for all xν P Xνpxˆ
´νq.
In other words this means that xˆ P K Ă L2pr0, T s,Rnν q is a time-dependent
generalized Nash equilibrium if for all ν, xˆν P L2pr0, T s,Rnν q solves the follow-
ing optimization problem
max
xνPXνpxˆ´νq
θνpx
ν , xˆ´νq
GNEPs with infinite-dimensional strategy spaces have been investigated in re-
cent years (see for instance [2, 4, 5]). In [4, 5] the concavity or convexity of all
objective functions was considered in order to obtain an existence result. Recently
in [2] the authors give an existence result under generalized convexity (more pre-
cisely semistrictly quasiconcavity) and in the jointly convex case. In this sense, we
propose an existence result under only quasiconcavity of all objective functions and
classical hypothesis on the constraint set-valued map, which generalizes Theorem
6 in [8].
A function f : L2pr0, T s,Rnq Ñ R is said to be
• quasiconcave if for any x, y P L2pr0, T s,Rnq and λ P r0, 1s, we have
fpλx` p1´ λqyq ě mintfpxq, fpyqu;
• semistrictly quasiconcave if it is quasiconcave and for any x, y P L2pr0, T s,Rnq,
such that fpxq ‰ fpyq, and λ Ps0, 1r, we have
fpλx` p1´ λqyq ą mintfpxq, fpyqu.
A set-valued map F : L2pr0, T s,Rnq Ñ L2pr0, T s,Rnq is said to be:
• upper semicontinuous at the point x P L2pr0, T s,Rnq if for any open W
such that F pxq Ă W , there exists a neighborhood V of x such that, for all
z P V , we have F pzq ĂW .
• lower semicontinuous at the point x P L2pr0, T s,Rnq if for any open W
such that F pxq XW ‰ H, there exists a neighborhood V of x such that, for
all z P V , we have F pzq XW ‰ H.
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Our existence result will be obtained as a consequence of Kakutani’s Theorem
which is stated in the next result and it can be found in [9].
Theorem 1.1 (Kakutani). LetK be a nonempty compact convex subset of a locally
convex space E and let T : K Ñ K be a set-valued map. If T is upper semicontin-
uous such that for all x P K , T pxq is nonempty, closed and convex, then T admits
a fixed point.
2 Existence Result
As we have already mentioned earlier, our aim is to prove the existence of a time-
dependent Nash equilibrium, and this will be done thanks to a reformulation of the
equilibrium problem into an associated fixed point problem.
With the previous notation of time-dependent GNEP, for any given optimal
strategy x´ν of the rival players, let us define
Sνpx
´νq “ txˆν P Xνpx
´νq : θνpxˆ
ν , x´νq ě θνpx
ν , x´νq for all xν P Xνpx
´νqu,
and also the set-valued map S : K Ñ K defined as Spxq “
pź
ν“1
Sνpx
´νq, where
K “
pź
ν“1
Kν .
The following proposition connects the notions of equilibrium and fixed point.
Proposition 2.1. Let xˆ P K , then xˆ is a time-dependent generalized Nash equilib-
rium if and only if it is a fixed point of S.
Proof. The vector xˆ is a time-dependent generalized Nash equilibrium if and only
if for each ν it satisfies θνpxˆ
ν , xˆ´νq ě θνpx
ν , xˆ´νq, for all xν P Xνpxˆ
´νq, i.e.
xˆν P Sνpxˆ
´νq, which is equivalent to xˆ P Spxˆq.
We are ready for our main result.
Theorem 2.2. With the previous notation, let us assume that:
1. There exist p nonempty, convex and weakly compact setsKν Ă L
2pr0, T s,Rnν q
such that for every x P L2pr0, T s,Rnq with xν P Kν for every ν, Xνpx
´νq
is nonempty, closed and convex, Xνpx
´νq Ă Kν , and Xν , as a set-valued
map, is both upper and lower semicontinuous;
2. the function θν is continuous for every player ν;
3. the function θνp¨, x
´νq is quasiconcave onXνpx
´νq for every player ν.
Then there exists a time-dependent generalized Nash equilibrium.
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In order to proof the above theorem we need Berge’s maximum theorem which
can be found in [10].
Theorem 2.3 (Berge’s maximum theorem). Let X,Y be two metric spaces, f :
X ˆ Y Ñ R be a function and F : X Ñ 2Y a set-valued map. Assume that f
is continuous, F is both upper and lower semicontinuous; and F is nonempty and
compact valued. Then it follows that
1. ϕ : xÑ max
yPF pxq
fpx, yq is a continuous function from X to R.
2. Φ : xÑ arg max
yPF pxq
fpx, yq is an upper semicontinuous set-valued map from
X to 2Y and compact-valued.
Proof of Theorem 2.2. The continuity of θν and the upper and lower semicontinu-
ity of Xν implies, by Theorem 2.3, the upper semicontinuity of the set-valued map
Sν , for all ν. Moreover, Sν has closed convex values due to conditions 2 and 3.
Therefore, the set-valued map S is upper semicontinuous with closed convex val-
ues. Since K is weakly compact, applying Theorem 1.1, S has at least one fixed
point. By Proposition 2.1 the result follows.
3 Application: Time-dependent Abstract Economy
Arrow and Debreu in 1954 (see [1]) considered a general “economic system”,
named abstract economy, along with a corresponding definition of equilibrium.
After this pioneering work, several authors established the existence of an equilib-
rium that included production and consumption, see for instance [3, 6].
Recently Donato et al. introduced in [7] the concept of time-dependent abstract
economy, for which they give an existence result by a variational reformulation.
Motivated by this last work, we give an existence solution for a time-dependent
abstract economy problem using the time-dependent GNEP formulation. More
precisely, we suppose there are l distinct commodities (including all kinds of ser-
vices). Each commodity can be bought or sold at a finite number of locations (in
space and time). The commodities are produced in “production units” (compa-
nies), whose number is s. For each production unit j there is a set Aj of possible
production plans. An element aj P Aj is a vector in L
2pr0, T s,Rlq. We note that
the sign of the hth component at time t of this last vector has a particular mean-
ing. When the quantity a
j
hptq is positive, it represents the commodity offered in
the market by the production unit j at time t, this is known as an output. When
a
j
hptq is negative, it represents the amount of this commodity that will be used in
the production process (like raw materials), this is known as an input. When a
j
hptq
equals to zero the production unit j does not produce the commodity h at time t
nor it is required in the production process (it is not an input nor and output). If we
denote by p P L2pr0, T s,Rlq the prices of the commodities, the production units
will naturally aim at maximizing the total revenue.
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We also assume the existence of “consumption units”, typically families or in-
dividuals, whose number is r. Associated to each consumption unit i we have a
vector bi P L2pr0, T s,Rlq, where bihptq represents the quantity of the hth commod-
ity consumed by the ith individual at time t. When bihptq is positive, it represents
the amount of commodity h being consumed in the market by the consumption
unit i at time t. When it is negative, it represents a labor service being offered by
the consumption unit i at time t. When this quantity is zero the consumption unit
i does not consume the commodity h at time t nor it offers it as a labor service.
In general, bi must belong to a certain set Bi Ă L
2pr0, T s,Rlq which is convex,
closed and bounded from below, i.e., there is a vector βi such that βihptq ď b
i
hptq
a.e. in r0, T s, for all h. The set Bi includes all consumption vectors among which
the individual could choose one if there were no budgetary constraints (the latter
constraints will be explicitly formulated below). We also assume that the ith con-
sumption unit is endowed with a vector ξi P L2pr0, T s,Rl`q of initial holding of
commodities and has a contractual claim to the share αij of the profit of the jth
production unit such that αij ě 0 and
rÿ
i“1
αij “ 1 for all j. Under these conditions
it is then clear that, given a vector of prices p, the choice of the ith unit is further
restricted to those vectors bi P Bi such that
xxp, biyy ď xxp, ξiyy `
sÿ
j“1
αijxxp, a
jyy
As it is standard in economic theory, the consumption units aim is to maximize a
utility function uipb
iq.
Definition 3.1. A time-dependent economic equilibrium is a vector of the form
paˆ1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , aˆs, bˆ1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , bˆr, pˆq
such that
xxpˆ, aˆjyy “ max
ajPAj
xxpˆ, ajyy, for all j (1)
uipbˆ
iq “ max
biPDipaˆ,pˆq
uipb
iq, for all i (2)
rÿ
i“1
xxpˆ, bˆi ´ ξiyy ´
sÿ
j“1
xxpˆ, aˆjyy “ max
pPP
rÿ
i“1
xxp, bˆi ´ ξiyy ´
sÿ
j“1
xxp, aˆjyy (3)
where Dipa, pq “
#
bi P Bi : xxp, b
iyy ď xxp, ξiyy `max
#
0,
sÿ
j“1
αijxxp, a
jyy
++
and P “
#
p P Lpr0, T s,Rlq : p ě 0,
1
T
ż
T
lÿ
h“1
phptqdt “ 1
+
.
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The following lemma says that the consumption units’ demand must be always
satisfied in average by the production units. Moreover, the commodities whose
price is zero a.e. in r0, T s, are only possible if the supply exceeds the demand a.e.
in r0, T s.
Lemma 3.2. Let Aj be a set such that 0 P Aj , for all j. If paˆ, bˆ, pˆq is a time-
dependent economic equilibrium thenż T
0
«
rÿ
i“1
pbˆihptq ´ ξ
i
hptqq ´
sÿ
j“1
aˆ
j
hptq
ff
dt ď 0, for all h (4)
Moreover, if there exists a consumption unit i0 whose utility function ui0 has no
maximum in Bi0 (non-satiation), i.e., for all b
i0 P Bi0 there exists a b
i0
P Bi0 such
that ui0pb
i0
q ą ui0pb
i0q, then
rÿ
i“1
xxpˆ, bˆi ´ ξiyy ´
sÿ
j“1
xxpˆ, ajyy “ 0. (5)
Proof. This result follows from some arguments that appear in Theorem 3 of [6]
and Section 1.4.2 of [1]. Since 0 P Aj and (1) is satisfied, xxpˆ, aˆ
jyy ě 0 and thus,
sÿ
j“1
xxpˆ, αij aˆ
jyy ě 0.
On the other hand, as bˆ P Dpaˆ, pˆq, we deduce that
rÿ
i“1
xxpˆ, bˆi ´ ξiyy ´
sÿ
j“1
xxpˆ, aˆjyy ď 0 (6)
Now consider p defined as
ph “
"
0, h ‰ h0
1, h “ h0
clearly p P P . Therefore, by (3) we haveCC
p,
rÿ
i“1
pbˆi ´ ξiq ´
sÿ
j“1
aˆj
GG
“
ż T
0
«
rÿ
i“1
pbˆih0ptq ´ ξ
i
h0
ptqq ´
sÿ
j“1
aˆ
j
h0
ptq
ff
dt ď 0.
Moreover, if there exists a consumption unit i0 whose utility function ui0 has
no maximum inBi0 , then for bˆ
i0 there exists bi0 such that ui0pb
i0q ą ui0pbˆ
i0q. This
implies in turn that ui0pλb
i0 ` p1 ´ λqbˆi0q ą ui0pbˆ
i0q, for all λ Ps0, 1r. Suppose
the strict inequality held in (6), i.e.
rÿ
i“1
xxpˆ, bˆi ´ ξiyy ´
sÿ
j“1
xxpˆ, ajyy ă 0.
If this is the case we could choose a λ small enough for which the inequality is still
satisfied and λbi0 ` p1´ λqbˆi0 P Di0paˆ, pˆq which is a contradiction.
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Finally, we can prove the existence of a time-dependent economic equilibrium
using Theorem 2.2.
Theorem 3.3. If the following hold:
piq The set Aj is convex and weakly compact and 0 P Aj , for all j;
piiq the function ui is semistrictly quasiconcave and continuous, for all i.
Then, there exists a time-dependent economic equilibrium.
Proof. First, we consider S “
ś
Sh where
Sh “
$’&
’%f P L2pr0, T s,Rq :
f ě 0 a.e. in r0, T s andż T
0
fptqdt ď
ż T
0
rÿ
i“1
ξihptqdt`R
,/.
/-
with R ą 0 and
ˇˇˇ
ˇˇż T
0
sÿ
j“1
a
j
hptqdt
ˇˇˇ
ˇˇ ă R, for all h.
We use the following notation:
• x “ pa, b, pq “ pa1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , as, b1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , br, pq and
xν “
$&
%
aν , ν P t1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , su
bν´s, ν P ts` 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , s` tu
p, ν “ s` t` 1
• The objective functions θν are defined as:
θνpxq “
$’’’&
’’’%
xxp, aνyy, ν P t1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , su
uν´spb
ν´sq, ν P ts ` 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , s` tuCC
p,
tÿ
i“1
pbi ´ ξiq ´
sÿ
j“1
aj
GG
, ν “ s` t` 1
Clearly, each objetive function is semistrictly quasiconcave.
• The strategy set of player ν is defined as:
Xνpx
´νq “
$&
%
Aν ν P t1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , su
Dν´spa, pq X S, ν P ts ` 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , s` tu
P, ν “ s` t` 1
It is clear that for each x´ν the strategy set Xνpx
´νq is convex and closed.
By Theorem 2.2 the time-dependent GNEP has a solution of the form xˆ “
paˆ, bˆ, pˆq.
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Finally, we will prove that paˆ, bˆ, pˆq is a time-dependent equilibrium. First,
notice that it holds (4). Thus,ż T
0
bˆihptqdt ď
ż T
0
rÿ
i“1
bˆihptqdt ď
ż T
0
rÿ
i“1
ξihptqdt`
ż T
0
sÿ
j“1
aˆ
j
hptqdt ă
ż T
0
rÿ
i“1
ξihptqdt`R
If there is a b
i
P Dipaˆ, pˆq such that uipb
i
q ą uhpbˆ
iq, then the semistrictly quasicon-
cavity implies uipλb
i
` p1´ λqbˆiq ą uipbˆ
iq, for every λ Ps0, 1r. Now, consider
J “ max
h
"ˇˇˇ
ˇ
ż T
0
b
i
hptqdt
ˇˇˇ
ˇ` 1
*
and I “ min
h
#ż T
0
rÿ
i“1
ξihptqdt`R´
ż T
0
bˆihptqdt
+
For 0 ă λ ă mint1, I{Ju, the following holds:ż t
0
pλb
i
hptq ` p1´ λqbˆ
i
hptqqdt ď λ
ż T
0
b
i
hptqdt`
ż T
0
bˆihptqdt ă
ż T
0
rÿ
i“1
ξihptqdt`R
that means, λb
i
` p1´ λqbˆi P Dipaˆ, pˆq X S. However, this is a contradiction.
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